Roles of mutation rate and co-existence of multiple strategy updating
  rules in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games by Takesue, Hirofumi
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
09
57
0v
3 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  2
7 J
ul 
20
19
epl draft
Roles of mutation rate and co-existence of multiple strategy up-
dating rules in evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma games
Hirofumi Takesue1
Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University - 1–104, Tozuka, Sinjuku, Tokyo, 1698050, Japan
PACS 87.23.Kg – Dynamics of evolution
PACS 87.23.Ge – Dynamics of social systems
PACS 02.50.Le – Decision theory and game theory
Abstract – The emergence and maintenance of cooperation has attracted intensive scholarly in-
terest and has been analysed within the framework of evolutionary game theory. The role of inno-
vation, which introduces novel strategies into the population, is a relatively understudied aspect of
evolutionary game theory. Here, we investigate the effects of two sources of innovation—mutation
and heterogeneous updating rules. These mechanisms allow agents to adopt strategies that do
not rely on the imitation of other individuals. The model introduces—in addition to canonical
imitation-based strategy updating—aspiration-based updating, whereby agents switch their strat-
egy by referring solely to the performance of their own strategy; mutation also introduces novel
strategies into the population. Our simulation results show that the introduction of aspiration-
based rules into a population of imitators leads to the deterioration of cooperation. In addition,
mutation, in combination with heterogeneous updating rules, also diminishes cooperators. This
phenomenon is prominent when a large proportion of the population consists of imitators rather
than adopters of aspiration-based updating. Nevertheless, a high mutation rate, in combination
with a low aspiration level, has positive nonlinear effects, and a heterogeneous population achieves
a higher level of cooperation than the weighted average of homogeneous populations. Our results
demonstrate the profound role of innovation in the evolution of cooperation.
Introduction. – A core problem in societies is the
tension between individual selfishness and social efficiency.
While mutual cooperation leads to the socially efficient
outcomes, individuals are tempted to take advantage of
others’ cooperative efforts without bearing the cost of co-
operation [1]. To understand the manner in which cooper-
ation is maintained and the reason for its wide prevalence
in societies despite this susceptibility to ‘free-riding’, in-
tensive research, adopting the framework of evolutionary
game theory, has been widely conducted in the biological
and social sciences [2, 3]. Statistical physicists have also
extracted in-depth understanding of this topic through the
application of their analytical and computational methods
[4–7].
Network structure is a cooperation-enhancing mecha-
nism that has attracted much attention. Here, instead of
interacting with randomly selected individuals, agents in
the system interact with (fixed) neighbours in networks.
Since Nowak and May’s [8] seminal work showing that
a lattice structure supports cooperation, several studies
have examined the relationship between cooperation and
many types of complex networks [9–11]. Many investi-
gations have interrogated the role of network structure
in combination with other mechanisms, including network
evolution [12–16]; punishment [17–26]; mobility [27, 28];
the mixing of different games [29,30]; exclusion from social
games [31–33]; strategy persistence [34,35]; overconfidence
[36] and environmental feedback [37, 38].
Payoff-based copying of strategies is the basic compo-
nent of evolutionary games. Many studies assume that
agents compare their payoff (fitness) with that of their
neighbour, copying that neighbour’s strategy with higher
probability if that neighbour achieves a higher payoff [39].
This rule may be understood as the model of genetic evo-
lution or cultural evolution through social learning (imita-
tion) [40]. This mechanism depends on other individuals
as the copy model, and once a strategy becomes extinct,
it will not reemerge in the population.
Here, we aim to examine the role of innovation in evolu-
tionary processes, where innovation connotes the adoption
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of a strategy that does not rely on others as an informa-
tion source. In particular, we investigate the combined
effects of two sources of innovation: heterogeneous updat-
ing rules and mutation. We first address the updating
rules that determine the manner in which agents modify
their strategies. In addition to the widely adopted payoff-
based copying of a neighbour’s strategy [4], many studies
have examined the outcomes of other updating rules such
as aspiration dynamics [41–45]; Glauber dynamics [46–50]
and conformity [51–55].
Whether a rule is innovative or non-innovative is one
important classification criterion of updating rules [49].
Agents who use innovative dynamics can adopt a strat-
egy that does not exist in the current population; in
contrast, agents who use a non-innovative rule can only
adopt strategies that exist and have been adopted by other
agents in the current population. Because agents cannot
copy specific strategies that have not already been used by
any other agents, the widely adopted payoff-based copy-
ing of strategy is a non-innovative rule. The aspiration
dynamics that we adopt in this study are an example of
innovative dynamics. Agents who rely on this rule tend to
maintain the current strategy if the strategy brings them a
larger payoff than their aspiration level; in contrast, agents
who are dissatisfied with the performance of their current
strategy may try other strategies without referring to the
strategies of others.
The multiple candidates for strategy-updating rules mo-
tivate researchers to investigate the effect of heterogeneous
rules. Research has shown that heterogeneous dynamics
lead to different cooperation levels and complex patterns
that are not observed in homogeneous systems. For in-
stance, the co-existence of two different payoff-based copy-
ing rules may enhance cooperation [56]. In a well-mixed
population, combination with an innovative rule can sup-
port cooperation among imitators [57], whereas in struc-
tured population, it can deter cooperation [49, 58]. Here,
we consider a model in which imitation dynamics and as-
piration dynamics co-exist in the population.
Another source of innovation is mutation, in which in-
dividuals adopt one strategy randomly. Random modifi-
cations of traits may sometimes greatly alter the results of
socio-physical models [59]. Studies of evolutionary games
have shown the vulnerability of cooperation sustained by
the payoff-based copying rule to the introduction of mu-
tation [60, 61]. Despite the importance of the effect of
mutation in evolutionary games [62], this effect is under-
studied, particularly when the model includes innovative
updating rules. A recent study has demonstrated the ro-
bustness of outcomes of evolutionary games against the
network structure when agents adopt aspiration dynamics
[63]. Robustness against mutation may also be an impor-
tant factor in aiding our understanding of the applicability
of updating rules.
Here, we examine the effects of the mutation rate and
heterogeneous updating rules, and investigate the role of
innovation in the prisoner’s dilemma games. In the second
and third sections, we explain the scrutinised model and
explain the results of the Monte Carlo simulations, respec-
tively. In the final section, we discuss the implication of
our model and its possible future extension.
Model. – We consider the social games played by
agents located on the L × L square lattice with a peri-
odic boundary condition. All agents have eight neighbours
(Moore neighbourhood), with whom they participate in
games. In examining the role of the extension of simple
models, the adoption of the lattice structure is useful [6].
Heterogeneous networks, unlike regular networks, can af-
fect evolutionary outcomes through not only the different
numbers of games that agents participate in [9] but also
the different numbers of opportunities to be referred as a
role agent in the imitation process [64, 65].
We adopted prisoner’s dilemma games as a simple model
of the social dilemma. Agents have two strategies in this
game: cooperation and defection. Mutual cooperation
achieves payoff R = 1, whereas mutual defection leads
to payoff P = 0. If one agent chooses cooperation (defec-
tion) and his/her partner chooses defection (cooperation),
she/he will gain S = 0 (T = b). Here, the harshness
of the social dilemma is controlled by one parameter—b
(1 < b < 2) [8]. Initially, half of the agents adopt cooper-
ation.
Each round involves agents participating in the game
with all of their neighbours and accumulating payoff.
Agents update their strategy on the basis of their payoff.
In this study, following the seminal article involving as-
piration dynamics, we assume synchronous updating [41].
Imitation dynamics and aspiration dynamics are the two
types of dynamics co-existing in the model. Throughout
a simulation run, each agent keeps adopting one of these
two rules. At the outset of simulation, pL2 agents are as-
signed the aspiration-based rule, and the rest are assigned
the imitation rule.
In strategy updating by imitation dynamics, the focal
agent (i) chooses one of the neighbours randomly as a role
agent (j). The accumulated payoffs of these two agents
(Πi and Πj) are compared, and the focal agent tends to
imitate the role agent’s strategy when the role agent earns
a larger payoff. The imitation probability is determined
by the following equation [39]:
Pi←j = 1/[1 + exp(β(Πi −Πj))], (1)
where β is the intensity of the effect of payoff difference
on the imitation probability (β →∞ implies deterministic
imitation, whereas β → 0 implies random adoption of the
strategy).
Other agents update their strategy according to
the aspiration-based rule. An agent who adopts the
aspiration-based rule (i) compares his/her payoff with an
exogenously set aspiration level (A). The focal agent is
more likely to adopt another strategy when the current
strategy does not realise a satisfying payoff. The proba-
bility of switching is calculated by the following equation
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[41]:
PiA = 1/[1 + exp(β(Πi − kiA))], (2)
where ki (agents’ degree) is set at 8 in this study. For
the sake of simplicity, we utilised the same values of β for
imitation dynamics and aspiration dynamics.
The agents’ strategy can be modified by not only the
payoff-based strategy updating but also mutation. Muta-
tion occurs with the probability of µ, and when it does,
agents adopt one strategy randomly. Our interest is in
understanding the manner in which the mutation rate (µ)
affects the evolutionary outcomes.
Results. – In our investigation of evolutionary out-
comes, we conducted Monte Carlo simulation. Simulation
runs first continued for 104 periods, and we subsequently
sampled the average of the following 2000 periods. We
conducted four simulation runs for each combination of
parameters and reported their average values, focussing
our principal interest on the proportion of cooperators in
stationary states (ρC). We also observed ρ
I
C (ρ
A
C), the
proportion of cooperators among the agents who adopted
imitation (aspiration) dynamics. In addition, we some-
times investigated the presence of nonlinear effects of het-
erogeneity in strategy updating rules. In this case, we
examined the following quantity [49]:
∆ρ = ρmix − [(1 − p)ρimt + pρasp], (3)
where ρmix is the proportion of cooperators in the hetero-
geneous system in which (1− p)L2 agents adopt imitation
dynamics and pL2 agents adopt aspiration dynamics. In
contrast, ρimt (ρasp) is the outcome with a homogeneous
population where all agents adopt imitation (aspiration)
dynamics. If the two rules do not have mutual influence,
the resultant cooperation level will be merely the weighted
average of two homogeneous populations (i.e., ∆ρ is 0)
because compared cases share the same parameter values.
Hence, we can adopt this quantity as another indicator of
the success of cooperators given the specific value of p.
First, we present an overview of the basic patterns of
the simulation results. Figure 1 reports the proportion
of cooperators as a function of p. In many cases, the
introduction of aspiration dynamics into a homogeneous
population of imitators negatively affected the cooperation
level. This pattern was also observed in previous literature
examining imitation and innovative dynamics in a hetero-
geneous system. These studies attributed this trend to the
destruction, by the introduction of innovative dynamics,
of the cluster of cooperators that could have fostered co-
operators’ expansion [49, 58]. As a result of this drop, in
many cases, as demonstrated in the figure, the cooperation
level was lower than the weighted average of homogeneous
systems (i.e., ∆ρ is negative).
In addition, overall patterns of the figure show that
a high mutation rate essentially leads to lower coopera-
tion levels. Populations with a large proportion of im-
itative agents were particularly vulnerable to mutation.
(a) b = 1.02, A = 0.1
(c) b = 1.1  A = 0.1
(b) b = 1.02, A = 0.5
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Fig. 1: The proportion of cooperators as a function of the pro-
portion of adopters of aspiration dynamics (p). Drops in coop-
eration were observed with intermediate values of p as long as µ
was not overly large. Mutation essentially diminished the pro-
portion of cooperators, and populations with large proportions
of imitators were vulnerable to mutation. A high mutation
rate (µ = 0.1) and a low aspiration level (A = 0.1) enhanced
cooperation relative to the weighted average of homogeneous
systems. Fixed parameters: L = 100, β = 10.
In contrast, a relatively high cooperation level was main-
tained when a large proportion of the population adopted
aspiration dynamics. At the same time, a combination
of frequent mutation and heterogeneous dynamics could
have positive nonlinear effects on cooperation. We ob-
served clear concave relationships between p and ρC with
a high mutation rate (µ = 0.1) and a low aspiration level
(A = 0.1), which implies that ∆ρ was positive with these
parameter values.
Expanding on the simulation results, the upper (lower)
panel of fig. 2 reports ρC (∆ρ) as a function of µ and b for
different values of p. In this figure, the value of A is set
at 0.5. First, the figure clearly shows that the prevalence
of cooperators was broken by the introduction of muta-
tion. Although we observed a large number of cooperators
with a small b, the proportion of cooperators diminished
as the value of µ grew. This tendency was reversed only
after µ became overly large, and the system approached
totally random results. In addition, the parameter regions
in which cooperators could achieve a high frequency de-
pended on the value of p. We observed a similar pattern
with ∆ρ. For instance, although the results with p = 0.1
(panel (f)) show small nonlinear effects in a parameter re-
gion of the bottom-left corner, this region is reduced when
p = 0.3 (panel (g)).
Second, a population occupied by a large number of
adopters of aspiration dynamics is robust against muta-
tion. Although the introduction of aspiration dynamics
lowered the cooperation level (panels (a) and (b)) and
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Fig. 2: The proportion of cooperators (ρC ; panel (a)–(e)) and the effects of heterogeneity (∆ρ; panel (f)–(j)) as a function of the
mutation probability (µ) and temptation to defect (b). As long as the values of µ were not overly large, mutation diminished
cooperation levels. A population with a large number of adopters of imitation (aspiration) dynamics is vulnerable (robust) to
(against) mutation. Although we ran the simulation with b ≤ 1.8, we report the results for b ≤ 1.4 because the results were
stable with larger b. Fixed parameters: L = 100, β = 10, A = 0.5.
had detrimental nonlinear effects (panels (f) and (g)), fur-
ther increases in the numbers of agents adopting aspira-
tion dynamics led to a higher cooperation level (panels
(c)–(e)) and smaller detrimental effects of heterogeneous
dynamics (panels (h)–(j)). When the number of defectors
increased, more adopters of aspiration dynamics shifted
to cooperation because they became unsatisfied with the
low payoffs achieved by mutual defection. Consequently,
a total breakdown of cooperation among agents using the
aspiration-based rule was prevented. In contrast, imita-
tion dynamics lacked such resilience and cooperators just
decreased the frequency once their clusters were broken
down by mutation.
We then varied the value of other parameters to scru-
tinise the observed patterns. Panel (a) of fig. 3 reports
ρC as the function of µ and p. The figure demonstrates
the hindering of cooperation by the collaboration of het-
erogeneous rules and a high mutation rate. When p was
less than approximately 0.2, we found that the level of
p required to suppress cooperation became smaller as µ
became larger, suggesting that heterogeneous dynamics
and mutation collaboratively caused cooperation to dete-
riorate. As noted above, innovative dynamics can hinder
the formation of clusters of cooperators. Mutation, by
introducing defectors, can also break these clusters. Con-
sequently, the required number of adopters of aspiration
dynamics drops as µ increases. A similar collaborative
impediment of cooperation was observed with a large p as
well. Again, cooperation was inhibited to a smaller ex-
tent than it would in a population with large numbers of
imitators. Panel (b) shows the values of ∆ρ in the same
manner. The clearly observed pattern is that the values
of ∆ρ are almost zero when mutation occurs frequently.
Here, the introduction of aspiration dynamics no longer
causes decrease in ρC which corresponds to negative val-
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Fig. 3: The proportion of cooperators (ρC ; panel (a)) and ef-
fects of heterogeneity (∆ρ; panel (b)) as a function of the mu-
tation rate (µ) and the proportion of the adopters of aspiration
dynamics (p). Collaboration between mutation and heteroge-
neous dynamics lowered ρC . This tendency was prominent
among populations with a large number of imitators. ∆ρ be-
came almost zero once the values of µ became large enough.
Fixed parameters: L = 100, β = 10, b = 1.05, A = 0.5.
ues of ∆ρ.
Observing the proportion of cooperators among agents
who adopt each updating rule clarifies the roles of hetero-
geneous dynamics and the mutation rate. Figure 4 reports
ρC , ρ
A
C and ρ
I
C as a function of p. Panel (a) shows that
a mixture of heterogeneous dynamics had a larger influ-
ence on imitators (ρIC) although heterogeneity also low-
ered ρAC . Consequently, particularly in populations with
a large number of imitators, we observed a drop in ρC
(and ∆ρ) as shown in fig. 2. When a higher mutation
rate was introduced to the population (µ = 0.1), however,
fast mutation alone, without the introduction of aspira-
tion dynamics, could cause a deterioration in cooperation
among imitators. Here, the relationship between p and ρC
approached a linear one, and ∆ρ approached zero as we
observed in fig. 3(b).
The results of the simulation thus far showed mainly
p-4
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Fig. 4: The proportion of cooperators as a function of the pro-
portion of agents adopting aspiration dynamics (p). Heteroge-
neous dynamics had larger effects on imitators. A higher fre-
quency of mutation alone caused cooperation among imitators
to deteriorate, and the relationship between p and ρC became
linear. Fixed parameters: L = 100, β = 10, b = 1.02, A = 0.5.
that (the combination of) heterogeneous dynamics and
mutation diminished the cooperation level. We then ex-
amined the system with other values of parameters to in-
vestigate whether we would observe a different pattern.
Figure 5 reports the same results as fig. 2, with a different
aspiration level (A = 0.1). Although overall patterns are
similar to those of the results in fig. 2 regarding the coop-
eration level (ρC), the figure also shows a different pattern:
heterogeneous system often showed large nonlinear effects
(i.e. positive ∆ρ) and achieved higher cooperation level
than the weighted average of homogeneous populations.
The bottom panels of fig. 5 show that the values of ∆ρ
were often larger than 0.1. This result was not observed
in fig. 2, suggesting that differences in aspiration levels
led to differences in behaviour.
The positive ∆ρ with lower aspiration levels could be
accounted for by the fact that adopters of aspiration dy-
namics will stably choose the same strategy despite the
small payoff. Low aspiration induces agents to be satisfied
with a small payoff, providing them with little motivation
to change their behaviour. Introduced adopters of aspi-
ration dynamics can remain cooperative even when the
mutation frequency is high enough (or the temptation to
defect is large enough) to cause total deterioration of the
cooperation level among imitators. In addition, adopters
of aspiration dynamics can function as stably cooperative
neighbours enhancing cooperation among imitators. Al-
though a high aspiration level induces agents to choose
cooperation with probability about 0.5, the frequent strat-
egy switching prevents the aspiration dynamics from sup-
porting cooperative imitators.
Figure 6 reports ρC , ρ
A
C and ρ
I
C as a function of p to
corroborate this intuition. The values of b and µ in these
figures were selected so that a homogeneous population of
imitators could achieve only low cooperation level (see ρIC
when p = 0). In contrast to these low values of ρIC , among
the adopters of aspiration dynamics introduced into the
population, cooperation was robustly maintained. Here,
the introduction of agents who adopted the aspiration-
based rule also supported cooperation among imitators.
We observed a significant increase in ρIC , suggesting that
imitators also benefit from the introduction of aspiration
dynamics. The harmful effect of the introduction of aspi-
ration dynamics almost disappeared as shown in the right-
hand side panel of fig. 4; a low aspiration level (A = 0.1)
even led to the enhancement of cooperation.
Last, using other values of A, we examined how coop-
eration depends on the aspiration level. Figure 7 shows
∆ρ as a function of p for different values of A (µ is set
at 0.1). The figure shows that the introduction of as-
piration dynamics had a positive nonlinear effect, which
further depended on the aspiration level, and cooperation
was greatly enhanced with A = 0.02 and A = 0.3. In
particular, when a large majority of the population com-
prised imitators (small p), lower values of A led to the
large enhancement of cooperation, which is in line with
our argument above. Figure 8 shows that this pattern did
not depend on the values of b. The larger ∆ρ was observed
with small aspiration level (A = 0.02, panel (a)) than with
large aspiration level (A = 0.75, panel (b)).
Discussion. – We conducted Monte Carlo simula-
tions to examine the role of innovation in social dilemma
by paying attention to the mutation rate and heteroge-
neous strategy updating rules. Our simulation results
demonstrate that in combination with heterogeneous up-
dating rules, mutation causes a deterioration in coopera-
tion if the mutation rate is not overly large. This detri-
mental effect is prominent if a majority of the popula-
tion comprises imitators rather than adopters of aspira-
tion dynamics. Consequently, heterogeneous populations
achieve lower cooperation levels than the weighted aver-
age of homogeneous populations. However, frequent mu-
tation and heterogeneous dynamics sometimes foster co-
operation relative to the average results of homogeneous
systems. When cooperation among imitators is destroyed
by a high mutation rate, the introduction of aspiration dy-
namics has positive nonlinear effects on cooperation. This
effect is prominent when the introduced agents have low
aspiration levels.
Although our study contributes to an understanding of
the role of innovation by examining the effects of updat-
ing rules and mutation rates, there is room for further
investigation. Considering other updating rules—such as
Glauber dynamics and conformity—is an obvious line of
further research. Even among payoff-based copying rules,
various types of updating rules may be considered [56].
Imitation process can be enriched by including other fac-
tors, such as emotion [66, 67]. Our understanding con-
cerning the emergence of cooperation will be enriched by
investigation into the combination of these rules and their
vulnerability to mutation. Another possible extension is
the coevolution of updating rules. Here, the proportion
of each rule-updating strategy is not fixed; it can coe-
volve with strategy on the basis of the fitness of each rule.
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Fig. 5: The proportion of cooperators (ρC ; panels (a)–(e)) and the effect of heterogeneity (∆ρ; panel (f)–(j)) as a function of
the mutation probability (µ) and temptation to defect (b). A combination of mutation and heterogeneous updating rules could
have nonlinear positive effects on cooperation levels. Although we ran the simulation with b ≤ 1.8, we reports the results for
b ≤ 1.4 because the results were stable with larger b. Fixed parameters: L = 100, β = 10, A = 0.1.
(a) µ = 0.1, b = 1.02 (b) µ = 0.02, b = 1.1
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Fig. 6: The proportion of cooperators as a function of the
proportion of adopters of aspiration dynamics (p). Agents who
adopted aspiration dynamics chose cooperation even when the
majority of imitators chose defection, thereby also enhancing
cooperation among imitators. Fixed parameters: L = 100, β =
10, A = 0.1.
The coevolutionary mechanism also leads to the expansion
and shrinking of the parameter region where cooperation
is sustained [50, 58, 68–70]. Understanding the manner in
which mutation affects this coevolutionary process is an
interesting topic for future research—one that may help
us understand why some updating rules are adopted by
actual agents, including humans. Furthermore, the appli-
cation of the framework of this paper and related literature
will ultimately contribute to an understanding of other
types of moral behaviour beyond cooperation [71–74].
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